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Summary
Can diplomacy work without physical presence? International relations scholars con-
sider the European Union (EU) the most institutionalised case of international co-
operation amongst sovereign states, with the highest density of repeated diplomatic 
exchange. In a year, the Council of Ministers hosts on average 143 ministerial and 
200 ambassadorial meetings, along with hundreds of working group meetings. These 
intense diplomatic interactions came to an abrupt halt in mid-March 2020, when the 
spread of COVID-19 forced the Council to approve — in a manner unprecedented in 
European integration history — the temporary derogation from its rules of proce-
dures to allow votes in written form, preceded by informal videoconferences between 
ministers or ambassadors. This argumentative essay reflects on how we can use these 
extraordinary months of intra-European diplomacy to assess the viability of virtual 
diplomacy in the EU context and what lessons it provides as we seek more sustainable 
means of international engagement.
Keywords
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e-diplomacy – virtual diplomacy – technology – communication – governance
Downloaded from Brill.com10/30/2020 03:02:57PM
via free access
557A NEW PARADIGM FOR EU DIPLOMACY?
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 15 (2020) 556-568
1 Introduction1
Diplomacy, like so many aspects of life, has been significantly affected by the 
COVID-19 pandemic.2 The European Union (EU), a hugely complex diplomatic 
construction, has been no exception to this.3 The pandemic resulted in the un-
precedented decision in mid-March 2020 to end all face-to-face meetings with-
in the Council of the European Union. This required a temporary derogation 
from the Council’s rules of procedure to allow votes in written form, preceded 
by informal videoconferences between ministers, diplomats and officials.4 In 
a normal year, the Council hosts on average 143 ministerial and 200 ambas-
sadorial meetings, plus hundreds more meetings at the working group level. 
The last physical Council meeting — of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers — 
took place on 13 March. Only 9 ministers were present — the 18 other Member 
States were represented either by Ambassadors or Deputy Ambassadors.5 On 
10 March 2020 the European Council — where Heads of State or Government 
meet — convened its first meeting via videoconference, focusing primarily on 
coordinating the EU’s response to the pandemic. In the three months from 16 
March to 16 June, the Council organised 67 videoconferences across the vari-
ous ministerial formations, 3 for the European Council and another 6 between 
the EU and third countries.
This unprecedented shift of diplomatic activity from the physical to the vir-
tual has been successful, insofar as this ‘remote-control’ EU continued to con-
duct its business, albeit in less than ideal circumstances.6 But what has been 
the impact of this change on the quality of diplomatic interactions and the 
policy-making processes they enable? However unprecedented the past three 
months, it remains entirely possible that COVID-inspired restrictions will re-
main in place in some form, and the back and forth of officials from national 
capitals to Brussels might be further re-evaluated to reduce carbon footprints. 
In short, the current prevalence of e-diplomacy in the Council — as in other 
diplomatic settings7 — may continue. It is therefore timely and appropriate 
to consider the ramifications of this novel and increased use of technology-
enhanced modes of interaction for the nature of diplomacy, with the EU’s 
1 Heidi Maurer has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 840917.
2 Liechtenstein 2020; Faizullaev 2020.
3 Gotev 2020.
4 Council of Ministers 2020b.
5 Council of Ministers 2020a.
6 Barigazzi, de la Baume and Herszenhorn 2020.
7 Balakrishnan 2020; Grüll 2020; Kingdom of The Netherlands 2020.
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Council providing an ideal test case. To that end, this essay sets out the basis of 
a research agenda focusing on two key questions: 1) How does diplomacy work 
without physical presence, particularly in terms of its impact on negotiation, 
compromise seeking and co-operation; and 2) What questions does the use of 
e-diplomacy in the Council raise vis-à-vis governance, legitimacy and transpar-
ency? After briefly examining the practical effects of the switch to e-diplomacy 
on the Council, this essay discusses both questions in turn.
2 Diplomacy in the Council of the European Union
The high density of regular and repeated diplomatic interactions occurring in 
the Council reminds us that ‘negotiation, one of the key functions of diploma-
cy, is central to the way that the EU operates’.8 This essay proposes this institu-
tion as an ideal case to consider what it means when technologically enabled 
distance diplomacy replaces physical proximity. Representing the primary site 
of EU Member State engagement and deliberation, the Council is the EU’s 
‘fulcrum’,9 and the ‘institutional heart of decision-making’,10 with negotia-
tions taking place continuously at multiple levels and across multiple dossiers. 
The extensive literature on the Council and its operations demonstrates the 
highly dynamic and multidirectional nature of diplomacy.11 It also highlights 
the importance of the different Council levels (working groups, Committee of 
Permanent Representatives [Coreper] I and II, ministerial formations) as lo-
cations not only for the transaction of business but also as important venues 
for deliberation and sources of socialisation, inculcating participants over the 
longer term into particular norms and cultures of behaviour — what James 
March and Johan Olsen term the logic of appropriateness.12 Thus, repeated 
and regular engagement between officials either based in Brussels or sent by 
capitals ensures that the primary purposes of the machine are achieved: reach-
ing agreement and ‘getting the room to work’.
Physical proximity has always been crucial to these interactions. Whilst dip-
lomats and officials regularly engage with opposite numbers in Brussels and 
national capitals outside their meetings, being able to meet your interlocu-
tor in person has always been considered essential. One senior British official 
8 Hocking 2004a, 93.
9 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 321.
10 Lewis 2019, 158.
11 Puetter 2014; Naurin and Wallace 2008.
12 March and Olsen 1989; Lewis 2005.
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involved in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy even declared: 
‘Brussels works on meals, not on the Council meetings, so you see a problem 
and then you decide who you are going to invite to dinner to thrash it out’.13 
Thus, although the pandemic-related restrictions altered dramatically the 
normal rhythms and flow of Council business, in particular contexts attempts 
were made to ensure important business could continue. For example, meet-
ings of Coreper II, the most senior ambassadorial formation involving Member 
States’ Permanent Representatives, ‘continue to take place physically in these 
difficult coronavirus times, [although] respecting social distancing measures’.14 
Meanwhile, Ambassadors to the Political and Security Committee followed 
their normal twice-weekly meeting routine until 20 March; their business was 
then disrupted only until 8 May when meetings resumed but with social dis-
tancing measures in place and attendance restricted to only the Ambassador 
plus one official. This highlights the reality that even when other international 
organisations enforced stricter lockdown measures,15 the Council and there-
fore Member States, continued to place great importance on maintaining 
some level of physical engagement and functionality for their most significant 
bodies. This suggests that in some contexts, therefore, e-diplomacy and vid-
eoconferencing are not considered adequate substitutes for their physical al-
ternative. Indeed, Angela Merkel has railed against the suboptimal nature of 
e-diplomacy with its ‘lack of personal interaction and the limited flexibility to 
have bilateral talks’.16
3 EU Diplomacy as Communication: How Does E-diplomacy Affect 
the Council?
The use of technologies to support virtual or e-diplomacy is not new.17 Rather, 
COVID-19 has necessitated their swift, large-scale adoption to enable a sem-
blance of normality and routine to continue. For many diplomats, though, 
e-diplomacy — particularly videoconferencing — is ‘a poor substitute for 
in-person meetings’.18 Whatever the technological alternatives, it is argued, 
nothing can replace physical encounters between colleagues and rivals, the 
13 Senior British official involved in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, inter-
viewed by the second author, 10 November 2011.
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quiet conversations on the margins of meetings or ‘corridor diplomacy’.19 It is 
in such contexts that so much diplomacy takes place. Body language can be 
read and nuance understood, allowing compromises to be reached and deals 
to be struck.20 This, certainly, is the view of William Burns, former US Deputy 
Secretary of State, who argues ‘there is still no alternative to old-fashioned 
human interactions’.21
There is extensive debate on this question in the literature, though. For ex-
ample, in their examination of the effectiveness of e-negotiation as an alterna-
tive to face-to-face contact, Amira Galin, Miron Gross and Gavriel Gosalker 
suggest that choice of ‘negotiation media does not yield any significant differ-
ence in the outcomes of negotiation’.22 However, by contrast, Jörg Hauber et al. 
note that ‘communicating through conventional videoconferencing tools is an 
artificial experience … due to the absence of eye-contact, lack of a shared social 
and physical context, and a limited possibility for informal communication’.23 
This echoes work by Seanon Wong, who highlights the importance that diplo-
mats attach to emotional cues in face-to-face negotiation.24 Meanwhile, David 
T. Nguyen and John Canny argue that if videoconferencing is to be effective in 
diplomatic interactions, it must enable both gaze and upper body cues.25 These 
debates matter, not least given that International Relations (IR) has tended 
to analyse diplomacy from a systemic perspective that takes little account 
of more personal or environmental factors. Marcus Holmes and Nicholas J. 
Wheeler are amongst those seeking to address this gap by examining diplo-
matic engagement from a psychosociological perspective.26 Their central argu-
ment is that in the development (or not) of social bonds between diplomats 
and political leaders, ‘how’ interaction takes place is as important as who is 
doing it. In this context, face-to-face meetings are ‘particularly important for 
building empathy and increased intention understanding’.27 The example 
they offer is the personal empathy and trust that developed between Ronald 
Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev that was so essential to peacefully ending the 
Cold War with their ‘iterative personal interactions’ over a period of time.
19 Greubel 2020.
20 Rettman 2020.
21 William Burns, as quoted in Wong 2020, 78.
22 Galin, Gross and Gosalker 2007, 794.
23 Hauber et al. 2005, 1.
24 Wong 2015.
25 Nguyen and Canny 2009.
26 Holmes and Wheeler 2020.
27 Holmes and Wheeler 2020, 135.
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Applying this to the EU’s Council, it is clear that the development of social 
bonds between diplomats and officials from the 27 Member States is a key ele-
ment in its successful functioning. The Council’s work depends on constant 
and regular engagement across a wide range of policy issues. A typical legisla-
tive file requires around eighteen months to go from initiation to formal adop-
tion as EU law. During this time, it travels up and down the Council’s structures, 
from the working groups that deal with highly technical policy questions up to 
Coreper, which acts as an important systemic bottleneck and de facto deci-
sion-maker, deciding whether a file should pass to ministers either for approval 
or, less likely, for further discussion. Multiple meetings therefore take place, 
with each level seeking to maximise agreement.28 In these contexts, significant 
degrees of trust and socialisation build up, with participants invested in the 
success of their shared endeavour.
An important issue in the context of e-diplomacy, therefore, is the impact of 
distance and not being in the room on these collective efforts. Diplomats and 
officials who attend meetings regularly develop a detailed understanding of 
their peers’ positions and needs on a given issue; moreover, repeated interac-
tions over an extended period make it feasible to anticipate likely demands and 
problems, itself a core task of Permanent Representations. The switch from 
physical to virtual engagement would not necessarily be detrimental to nego-
tiations on a file that has been in the Council system for some time. However, 
for new files or policy questions, particularly those involving a different set of 
national experts, some of whom may have little experience in Council nego-
tiating processes, it must be asked whether the quality of diplomatic engage-
ment and negotiation will be affected, as per Holmes and Wheeler’s argument. 
The example of the UK-EU Future Relationship negotiations is instructive 
in this case. After just one round of face-to-face meetings, negotiators had to 
change to a virtual format, which after four rounds had produced few tangible 
results. In part, this is due to the complexity of the issues under discussion and 
to the nature of such negotiations that often result in little initial movement. 
The fact, though, that participants were unable to meet physically and develop 
a rapport has been identified as a particular difficulty. As Michel Barnier noted 
on 24 April: ‘We held some 40 videoconferences this week, and I have to say, 
objectively, that it is not the same thing in terms of the quality of discussions 
and negotiations’.29 Equally, it is arguable that the marathon July European 
Council meeting, which saw agreement reached on both a €750 billion COVID 
28 Bostock 2002.
29 Barnier 2020.
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rescue package and the EU’s seven-year budget settlement, was successful only 
because the leaders were physically together in the same room.30
The Member States’ decision to ensure senior diplomatic formations could 
continue their work face-to-face and the difficulties of beginning complex 
negotiations in a virtual environment highlight the relevance of questions 
around the impact of e-diplomacy on Council activity. In particular, we should 
consider how well officials and diplomats can prepare for engagement in 
this context and how they mitigate the difficulties posed by e-diplomacy and 
 videoconferencing — not least, only seeing their interlocutors in two dimen-
sions rather than three. Is it possible to identify particular moments, in a set of 
diplomatic interactions when the diplomats are not physically present, which 
have a particularly deleterious impact on outcomes? And over the longer term, 
what does this mean for processes of socialisation and the development of 
relationships that are key to successful outcomes?
4 EU Diplomacy as Governance: Balancing Solution Delivery  
and Legitimacy
Scholarship on the changing nature of diplomacy over the past decades em-
phasises the stronger role of diplomats as boundary spanners31 and their con-
tribution to governance.32 Again, the EU is an extreme and thus excellent case 
to observe how the pandemic has influenced the contribution of diplomacy 
to governance. This essay suggests three dynamics that should inform future 
research about European diplomatic interactions: the balancing of efficiency 
and legitimacy; the link between Brussels-based diplomats and their national 
governments; and the collective locking in of policy ideas that persist even in 
or after crisis mode.
The most important aspect on the minds of diplomats and policy-makers in 
March and April 2020 was to keep national and European governance systems 
running efficiently and effectively. Apart from the continuity that Coreper II 
meetings ensured for negotiations between Member States, the first weeks 
of lockdown disrupted EU policy-making before the system found a new, al-
though still limited, modus operandi. We therefore need to assess diplomatic 
interaction at the EU level not only in terms of what it delivers but also in 
the democratic quality of the process. Bringing together academic discussions 
on the salience of diplomacy for citizens with the literature on EU legitimacy 
30 Herszenhorn and Bayer 2020.
31 Hocking 2004b.
32 Mitzen 2015, 120-134.
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and accountability33 provides relevant research avenues to consider how, after 
the first weeks of crisis, the EU governance system managed to rebalance the 
need to provide policy solutions while ensuring sufficient transparency, ac-
countability and legitimacy. In the domain of foreign affairs, for example, the 
last formal Foreign Affairs Council conclusions synthesising the discussions of 
EU Foreign Ministers were adopted on 16 March 2020. Since then, information 
about ministerial discussions has been provided by the High Representative in 
press conferences following the videoconference,34 with accompanying short 
summaries on the Council’s website.35 The absence of a regular paper trail in a 
system that is normally highly institutionalised necessitates a new discussion 
on legitimacy and accountability in EU foreign policy co-operation.
It also emphasises questions of institutional agency and leadership. Here, 
competing assumptions on the impact of the crisis are possible. It is logical 
to assume that in crisis mode Member States are keener to take back control, 
thereby limiting the space for EU institutional agency and policy leadership. 
On the other hand, it is also reasonable to assume that the more a govern-
ment is in crisis mode, the less bandwidth it has to consider everyday foreign 
policy making and, therefore, the more space there is for institutional policy 
agency. Empirical research needs to assess how these dynamics between diplo-
matic and political actors played out during the crisis and the extent to which 
these emergency processes linger once the system has returned to ‘normal’. In 
the event greater agency by the High Representative and European External 
Action Service (EEAS) are observed, we need to question whether the post-
crisis system has appropriate mechanisms in place to ensure sufficient legiti-
macy and control.
Second, how have the extraordinary lockdown measures affected the essen-
tial relationship between Brussels-based diplomats and their national govern-
ments? How far are the former able to ensure that their political masters do not 
lose sight of their collective ambitions and commitments? Are they still able 
to shape domestic thinking about policy solutions through the insights gained 
from negotiations with their Brussels peers? To what extent can they help their 
governments look beyond particular domestic (image) problems to the need 
for collective action? Even before the pandemic, there was increasing scholarly 
effort to achieve a better understanding of processes of renationalisation and 
de-Europeanisation in European capitals.36 A diplomatic studies perspective 
33 Sjursen 2018; Maurer and Morgenstern-Pomorski 2018.
34 EEAS 2020.
35 Council of Ministers 2020d.
36 Tonra 2018.
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can contribute a vital view of how individual ambassadors or diplomats can 
shape domestic policy design.
Finally, the pandemic raises questions about the extent to which the EU col-
lectively shapes and constrains national governments’ scope for policy action. 
In 1988, Fritz Scharpf developed the concept of the ‘joint decision trap’.37 The 
way Member States designed their policy responses to mitigate the negative 
economic impact of the COVID-19 lockdown puts the spotlight on how diplo-
matic interaction impacts the degree to which governments are or feel collec-
tively trapped into normative or political commitments. Here, two examples 
are instructive: the decision to bail out European airlines given EU commit-
ments to the ‘Green Deal for Europe’, and the reiterated commitment to fight-
ing disinformation in and outside of Europe. Neither is likely to have come 
high on the policy agenda of all 27 governments without active promotion — 
and emphasis on the collective commitment — by the European Commission 
and the High Representative/EEAS, respectively. Diplomacy is not simply 
about communicating interests and intentions. It is also the means by which 
such long-term commitments are locked in, even during and after a crisis. 
How these causal mechanisms function and interact can deliver innovative 
research about international governance, with the EU environment constitut-
ing a highly salient case study.
5 Conclusions
This essay has reflected on the impact of COVID-19-induced physical restric-
tions on EU diplomatic activity, sketching two avenues for future research. 
Technology, such as videoconferencing, is just a tool. It can magnify existing 
structural imbalances but also bring new opportunities for innovative forms 
of interaction between skilled diplomats. We need to better understand how 
diplomats in an online environment seek to nurture relationships that look 
beyond bargaining but also how e-diplomacy challenges legitimacy and trans-
parency. For both strands, this essay contends that EU diplomacy is a highly 
suitable case that will inform both EU and diplomatic studies scholarship.
At the same time, we must consider the extent to which we can draw wider 
insights from the experience of the EU Council system or whether, like the or-
ganisation itself, COVID-19 has produced a sui generis reaction. The particular 
nature of diplomatic activity within the EU — highly intense, with significant 
levels of institutionalisation, trust and socialisation — suggests the challenges 
37 Scharpf 1988.
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posed by the pandemic have been especially obvious but also comparably eas-
ier to tackle. This can be seen in the efforts to maintain some degree of ongo-
ing physical diplomatic interaction even as other international organisations 
introduced more stringent lockdowns. Conceivably, and especially in the event 
of future outbreaks of coronavirus, the EU Council may provide an example to 
others of how to maintain greater levels of ‘normal’ functionality during times 
of acute crisis. In other words, and particularly as we understand more about 
the nature of such pandemics, the operation of the EU Council system may 
offer a template to others for how to ensure greater continuity in the practice 
of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. It certainly provides scholars with a 
strong basis for new comparative work on diplomacy in multilateral settings.
The operation of the EU Council system during the pandemic also offers 
a potential wealth of data on diplomatic practice and on the utility of e-di-
plomacy technology. How EU and Member State officials and diplomats have 
experienced and coped with the challenges posed by distance diplomacy can 
reveal a great deal about the real potential for such technologies to replace (at 
least some) physical interaction and allow us to conduct a critical appraisal 
of whether it really does matter whether people are actually ‘in the room’. For 
countries and organisations with finite — and sometimes limited — resources 
available for diplomacy, the answers to such questions have the potential to 
transform both their diplomatic reach and ambition.
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